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 The Denial of Emergency 
Protection: Factors Associated With 
Court Decision Making 
 Carol E. Jordan 
 Adam J. Pritchard 
 University of Kentucky, Lexington 
 Pamela Wilcox 
 University of Cincinnati, Ohio 
 Danielle Duckett-Pritchard 
 University of Kentucky, Lexington 
 Despite the importance of civil orders of protection as a legal resource for victims of 
intimate partner violence, research is limited in this area, and most studies focus on the 
process following a court’s initial issuance of an emergency order. The purpose of this 
study is to address a major gap in the literature by examining cases where victims of 
intimate partner violence are denied access to temporary orders of protection. The study 
sample included a review of 2,205 petitions that had been denied by a Kentucky court 
during the 2003 fiscal year. The study offers important insights into the characteristics of 
petitioners and respondents to denied orders and outlines individual, contextual, structural, 
qualitative/perceptual, and procedural factors associated with the denial of temporary or 
emergency protective orders. Recommendations for statutory changes, judicial education, 
and future research to remedy barriers to protection are offered. 
 Keywords: protective orders; civil justice; intimate partner violence; legal system 
 For more than three decades, the justice system has offered civil remedies for victims of intimate partner violence in the form of civil protective or restraining orders. Over and above arrest, the codification of civil remedies was a substantive improve-
ment for victims in that civil orders (a) emphasized the public nature of these crimes, 
(b) addressed the relative ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system in protecting 
women from future harm, (c) and offered another option for women reluctant to prosecute 
their partners (Jordan, 2004). 
 Currently, all states have enacted laws authorizing the issuance of civil or criminal 
protective orders (Eigenberg, McGuffee, Berry & Hall, 2003; U.S. Department of Justice, 
2002), although specific provisions differ with respect to eligibility, filing procedures, 
burden of proof, duration, relief available, and enforcement (DeJong & Burgess-Proctor, 
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2006; Eigenberg, et al., 2003). For most state protective order statutes, “intimate partner 
violence” is defined as physical injury, sexual assault, or the infliction of fear of being 
victimized in these ways (DeJong & Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Finn, 1991). Remedies 
available through protective order statutes typically prohibit further acts of violence, 
communication with the victim (and in some states, members of the victim’s family), or 
going near the victim’s residence (Carlson, Harris, & Holden, 1999). Protective orders 
are first issued on an  ex-parte basis, meaning that the victim petitions the court without 
the offender’s presence, and if the court believes the violence exposes the petitioner to 
imminent harm, a temporary order may be issued by the court (Fischer & Rose, 1995; 
Jordan, Nietzel, Walker & Logan, 2004). Within a time frame set by the state’s law, a 
hearing will be held at which the offender has the due process right to present evidence 
(Eigenberg et al., 2003). If, on presentation of evidence by both parties at the full hear-
ing, the court continues to believe that violence has occurred and that future danger 
exists, an order of longer duration (typically more than a year) may be entered (Jordan 
et al., 2004). 
 A key provision of state statutes is that of eligibility. States typically include spouses, 
former spouses, persons who live or have lived together, and persons who have a child in 
common (Gist et al., 2001). A recent review also cited the inclusion of a newer category of 
“household member” and noted that over the past two decades, states have become more 
inclusive with respect to eligibility requirements (Eigenberg et al., 2003). 
 Provisions within state laws affect how many women get orders of protection by 
limiting eligibility to certain relationships, by stipulating qualifying types of abuse, and 
other provisions. In fact, some have suggested that it is difficult to interpret data on the 
number of women who seek protective orders in that “these rates may be affected by 
several factors, including whether they are eligible to receive protective orders in the 
jurisdiction in which they live and procedural barriers that may differ by jurisdiction” 
(Logan, Walker, Jordan & Leukefeld, 2006, p. 180). That influence acknowledged, stud-
ies suggest that a minority of women in the general population, criminal justice, and 
shelter samples access orders of protection in response to intimate partner violence. For 
example, the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS) found that approxi-
mately 20% of victims in the general population received a protective order (Tjaden & 
Thoennes, 2000). Pennell, Burke, and Mulmat (2002) found that 40% of women in a 
shelter sample had received a protective order, and in a study of police reports involving 
intimate partner violence, just over one-fifth (22%) showed access to at least one order 
of protection (Weisz, Tolman, & Bennett, 1998). Studies show higher rates of protective 
order use in stalking cases. The NVAWS found that 36.6% of stalking victims obtained 
a protective order after their last incident of intimate partner stalking victimization 
(Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000); Brewster (2000) reported that 51% of women filed for 
a protective order after being stalked by an ex-intimate partner; and in a study using 
prosecutor stalking case files, Nicastro, Cousins, and Spitzberg (2000) found that 76% 
involved protective orders. 
 Obtaining a temporary order of protection is only the first step in securing civil pro-
tection. A number of studies have investigated factors that influence why women who 
have secured temporary orders do not ultimately obtain permanent orders (Gondolf, 
McWilliams, Hart, & Stuehling, 1994; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Klein, 1996; Zoellner et al, 
2000). Harrell and Smith (1996) interviewed 355 women who filed petitions for temporary 
protective orders and found that less than half of the women (40%) who had received a 
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temporary order returned to request that the order be made permanent. The most common 
reasons cited by the women for not seeking the permanent order included that the partner 
had stopped bothering her (64%); the man talked her out of it (35%); the respondent went 
to counseling (25%); she feared retaliation (11%); or the temporary order did not work, 
giving her no reason to believe the permanent order would change his behavior (10%) 
(Harrell & Smith, 1996). It is important to note that 41% of the women did not secure the 
permanent order because the temporary order had never been served (Harrell & Smith, 
1996). Other studies suggest that a primary reason women do not seek help is because 
they fear retaliation (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Ferraro, 1997; Mears, Carlson, Holden & 
Harris, 2001; Zoellner, et al., 2000), a concern reinforced by studies showing that women 
who seek protective orders from the court are often threatened by offenders (e.g., Fischer 
& Rose, 1995). 
 Gondolf et al. (1994) pulled a random sample of 200 petitions for protective orders 
in one county and found that about three-quarters (76%) received a final protective order 
(their analysis was limited to petitions involving abuse of a female intimate partner). When 
women did not receive the permanent order, most often petitions were withdrawn (44%) 
or victims did not appear in court to obtain the order (37%). Only 5% of petitioners were 
denied a permanent order outright. Klein (1996) found that although the vast majority of 
women who sought the permanent order received it, almost half returned to court before 
the order’s expiration date to request that the order be dropped. Zoellner et al. (2000) 
studied the factors associated with a victim’s persistence in help-seeking and found that 
a victim’s perception of threat and her attachment to the offender correctly predicted 
completion of the protective order process in 88% of cases. In the majority of instances 
in which the woman did not seek the permanent order, that outcome related to “action or 
inaction on the part of the woman as opposed to a court decision that the order requests 
did not have merit” (Zoellner et al., 2000, p. 1088). 
 Studies that explore the percentage of women with temporary protective orders who 
do not obtain final orders offer important insights into whether or not the civil process 
offers true protection to victims and what barriers exist for a woman completing the 
protective order process. These studies are limited, however, by the fact that they sample 
women who have been granted temporary protection by a judge. In other words, they 
study the stage of the process after issuance of a temporary order and explore factors 
that impact whether the victim secures the permanent order. That approach excludes 
women who sought but were denied the court’s protection at all. Only two studies have 
addressed this earlier stage in the process, both using the same urban district attorney’s 
office. First, in a sample of 90 women who applied through the prosecuting attorney’s 
office for a temporary order of protection, Gist et al. (2001) found that 72.2% quali-
fied and 27.8% did not. On demographic and relationship status measures, there were 
no statistically significant differences between the two groups of women in this study. 
When abuse severity was compared between the two groups, only 1 of the 19 categories 
of threat was significantly higher for women qualifying for orders, and only 2 of 27 
categories of abuse were significantly higher for qualifying women. As described by 
the authors, “it is disturbing that 28% of the women requesting a protective order in this 
study had experienced appreciable threats of abuse, actual physical assault, and stalking, 
yet they were denied a protective order” (Gist et al., 2001, p. 645). In a study using the 
same methodology, McFarlane et al. (2004) found that 32% of women did not qualify 
for a temporary order. 
3072-107_05.indd   605 7/23/2008   1:23:00 PM
606 Jordan et al.
 THE PRESENT STUDY 
 Despite the importance of civil protective orders for victims of intimate partner violence, the 
body of research in this area is limited. Most research evaluating the procedure for obtaining 
orders focuses on the middle of the process (from issuance of temporary orders to obtaining 
a permanent order) or on whether permanent orders are violated by respondents rather than 
offering insight on the earliest steps women take in approaching the court for protection. 
Specifically, insufficient information is known about circumstances in which victims seek 
court protection and are initially denied that request. The Gist et al. (2001) and McFarlane 
et al. (2004) studies offer the only empirical look at circumstances where women do not 
qualify for orders on the front end. Although they are an important contribution, they reveal 
far too little about the process of denial, for decisions regarding disqualification in these stud-
ies are made by caseworkers and prosecutors, not the court, and the specific reason for the 
disqualification was not recorded. Also, findings of these studies are based on one large urban 
county where the process involves the prosecutor’s office, limiting their generalizability. 
 The purpose of this study is to address a major gap in the literature on protective orders 
by examining cases in which victims of intimate partner violence are denied access to 
temporary orders of protection. Specifically, the aims of the study are to explore (a) the 
percentage of petitions for temporary orders denied, (b) the characteristics of petitioners 
and respondents in these cases, (c) the types of abuse alleged in denied petitions, and 
(d) the reasons judges deny petitions for temporary protective orders. 
 METHOD 
 Sampling Procedure 
 In Kentucky, civil protective orders are obtained by petitioning a court of jurisdiction. If 
the court believes the allegations in the petition warrant immediate protection (by meet-
ing the statutory definition of abuse or fear of imminent abuse between two members of 
a qualifying relationship), a temporary order is granted (termed an emergency protective 
order or EPO). A hearing to consider issuance of a permanent order (termed a domestic 
violence order or DVO) is then docketed. If no EPO results, the denied petition is main-
tained by the court’s clerk in a file of denied orders. 
 With the assistance of the Supreme Court, authors accessed all protective order petitions 
denied by a court during the 2003 fiscal year. Of Kentucky’s 120 counties, 94 reported 
at least one denied order during the index fiscal year, 16 reported no denied orders, and 
12 submitted incomplete or incorrect information after three requests and so could not be 
included. The study sample included 2,205 petitions that had been denied by a Kentucky 
court during the 2003 fiscal year. Those orders represented 7.3% of the 30,413 petitions 
filed statewide during that same time frame. 
 Measures 
 Petitions were coded for demographic information and data in the following categories. 
 Relationships Between Petitioners and Respondents.  Of the 2,205 denied petitions, 
2,114 documented the relationship between the petitioner and respondent. Relationships 
were coded as “intimate” (spouse, ex-spouse, members of an unmarried couple with 
a child in common, members of an unmarried couple who are or have formerly lived 
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together, girlfriend, ex-girlfriend, boyfriend, or ex-boyfriend) or nonintimate (parent, 
child, stepchild, child of a cohabiting or other intimate couple, a person related by consan-
guinity or affinity in the second degree, or other non-intimate). In all, 31 relationships were 
described as “cousin” and had to be excluded, as no degree of consanguinity or affinity 
could be determined and state law requires at least second degree. 
 Type of Abuse Alleged.  Petitions for EPOs provide space for a petitioner to describe the 
abuse. Narrative accounts were coded by ten types of physical abuse, four types of sexual 
abuse, nine types of stalking, and seven types of threat. 
 Type of Relief Sought From the Court.  EPO petitions include a section for petitioners 
to indicate the relief requested, including refrain from further abuse; no contact; refrain 
from damaging property; vacate residence; temporary custody; temporary child support; 
summons; and additional relief. The type(s) of relief sought by petitioners was extracted 
from this section. 
 Reasons for a Court’s Denial of Protection.  In Kentucky, petitions are granted or 
denied by a reviewing judge who, in the event of a denial, provides an open-ended reason 
for denying the petition. Reasons for denial were coded into nine categories. 
 RESULTS 
 Demographic Information About Petitioner and Respondent 
 Petitioners of denied orders tended to be female (66.2%). Petitioners with known employ-
ment status tended to be employed (67.9%); 6.8% either drew SSI or were disabled. The 
mean age was 34.3 years, ranging from 14 to 93 years old and just over half had children 
(52.8%). Respondents tended to be male (58.5%) and employed (60.3%). Information 
about the respondent’s race was available in 97.4% of cases and reflected that 91.2% were 
White, 7.1% were African American, and 1.1% were Hispanic. (Petitions include items 
for the physical description of respondents only, so similar information could not be col-
lected for petitioners.) 
 The Combination of Genders by Petitioners and Respondents 
 As noted, women represented only 66.2% of petitioners, and, in fact, women filing against 
men constituted only half of the orders denied at the initial petition stage. This means that 
nontypical filing statuses (men filing against women and same-sex filing combinations) 
are overrepresented among initially denied protective orders, each representing about 
25% of denied petitions. Specifically, of the four possible combinations, a female filing 
against a male accounted for 50.2% of all denied petitions. For both cross-gender filing 
combinations (female filing against male, male filing against female), the majority of cases 
were filed against an intimate. Males filed against an intimate female 87.5% of the time, 
whereas females filed against an intimate male 78.1% of the time, a significant difference 
(χ 2 (1) = 20.687,  p = .000). For same-gender filings, females were significantly more likely 
to file against females than males against males (χ 2 (1) = 4.408,  p = .036). 
 Type of Relationship Between Petitioner and Respondent 
 A total of 2,114 respondents documented relationship type. Of those, 62.5% were intimates 
and 37.5% were nonintimates. Among intimates, the most common were spouse (41.8%), 
unmarried with children (18.1%), former spouse (15.4%), and unmarried  formerly 
3072-107_05.indd   607 7/23/2008   1:23:01 PM
608 Jordan et al.
 cohabiting (10.3%). For nonintimates, the most common were nonrelative (28.5%), child/
parent (22.7%), in-laws/ex-in-laws (18.4%), and other relative (13.4%). 
 Harm Indicated in Narrative 
 There were 396 denied petitioners (18%) who alleged at least one type of physical abuse, 
most often a slap or hit. Just under half of these petitioners (48.9%) indicated two or more 
types, with a mean number of physical abuse types experienced being 1.60 (s = .905). A 
total of 22 petitioners (1%) indicated some form of sexual abuse. The mean types of sexual 
abuse experienced equaled 1.45 (s = .671), with 46.4% of these victims experiencing two 
or more types of sexual abuse. There were 824 denied petitioners (37.4%) who indicated 
at least one stalking behavior in the petition narrative, a mean of 1.64 (s = 1.017). The 
highest number of stalking behaviors alleged in a narrative was seven, with 16% indicat-
ing three or more forms of stalking. Finally, 890 denied petitioners alleged that they were 
threatened, with 70.4% indicating being threatened in person, 29.3% in a phone call, and 
9.2% indirectly through a third party. 1 Also, 3.6% of denied petitioners alleged being 
threatened with a weapon, and 2% of denied petitioners alleged being threatened with or 
endangered within a car. 
 Medical Treatment Indicated in Narrative 
 The petitioner indicated injuries to self or others serious enough to have sought medical 
treatment in 29 (1.3%) of denied petitions. Of these, 90.1% corresponded to allegations 
of physical abuse against the petitioner. In other words, 6.8% of all petitioners alleging 
physical abuse sought medical treatment. Two petitioners experiencing physical and sexual 
abuse indicated medical treatment, and one alleging only sexual abuse sought medical 
treatment. Finally, there was one case of alleged physical abuse against a child for which 
medical treatment was sought. 
 Filing on Behalf of a Minor Child 
 Of the 2,205 denied petitions, 19.4% were filed on behalf of a minor. In these 395 cases, 
a parent was usually the petitioner (92.6%). Petitioners were filed on behalf of a minor 
child in 19.7% of cases where the respondent was an intimate partner, but in only 17.0% of 
cases where the respondent was a nonintimate. There is no significant difference (χ 2 (1) = 
2.241,  p = .134) in the proportion of denied cases filed on behalf of a minor with respect 
to the relationship between petitioner and respondent, suggesting that the nature of the 
petitioner-respondent relationship was not a determining factor for denying petitions filed 
on behalf of minor children. 
 Relief Requested From the Court by Petitioners 
 The most common type of relief requested in denied orders was seeking to have the 
respondent refrain from contact (88.7%), acts of abuse (72.4%), or destruction of property 
(69.3%) (Table 1). More than one-fourth of petitioners sought temporary custody and 
one-fifth sought to have the respondent removed from a shared residence. In 10.8% of 
cases, the petitioner sought other relief, most often including protection for others against 
respondent or protection for petitioner against associates of the respondent (31.2%); spe-
cial child care or visitation (13.5%); and drug testing, counseling, or mental health care 
for the respondent (11.8%).  
 [AuQ3] 
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 Reasons for Denial of Petitions 
 Table 2 categorizes reasons for denial by the reviewing judge. “Other” reasons for denial 
(15.5%) included “does not qualify” or “does not fit statute” with no explanation (22.1%); 
time lapse between abuse and petition filing, or no date provided (16.2%); custody issue 
TABLE 1. Relief Requests Made on EPO Petitions
Occurrences Percent of Valid Cases
Valid Restrain from contact or 
communication 1,952 88.7%
 
Restrain from further acts 
of domestic violence 1,593 72.4%
 
Restrain from damaging 
or disposing of property 1,525 69.3%
 
Grant temporary custody 
of children 560 25.5%
 
Direct respondent to 
vacate residence 441 20.0%
 
Requested some other 
type of relief a 237 10.8%
 
Award temporary child 
support 184 8.4%
Requested a summons to 
be issued 165 7.5%
a Excludes 122 cases that reiterated a previously marked form of relief in the blank for 
“other.”
TABLE 2. Reasons for EPO Denial Among All Denied Petitions
Occurrences Percent of Valid Cases
Valid Insufficient acts or threats 
of violence 1129 51.3%
 
Not domestic situation/
relationship 459 20.9%
 Other reason for denial 340 15.5%
 
Referred to law 
enforcement for 
criminal charges
226 10.3%
 
Denied with no reason 
provided 216 9.8%
 
Referred to state adult or 
child protection agency 97 4.4%
 Out of county 64 2.9%
Petition withdrawn or not 
pursued by petitioner 36 1.6%
DVO/EPO already exists 25 1.1%
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with action in court already pending (15.0%); court action pending ( juvenile/criminal/
divorce/property) (12.6%); and incomplete, incorrect, or illegible petition (11.5%).  
 Reasons for Denial Among Physical Abuse Victims 
 As noted, 396 petitioners (18%) documented at least one form of physical abuse. Of these, 
121 (30.6%) were denied because of insufficient acts of violence or threats of violence. 
Petitions denied for this reason did not reflect, on average, significantly fewer acts of 
violence than the petitions of physical abuse victims denied for reasons not including 
insufficient violence ( t = 1.706,  p = .089). 2 More than two-thirds of the 121 denied cases 
alleging physical abuse (70.2%), however, were denied solely because of insufficient acts 
of violence or threat of violence. Of the 121 petitions experiencing physical abuse but 
denied for insufficient acts or threats of violence, 29.7% were denied for both insufficient 
violence and one or more additional concerns, most commonly being (a) referred instead 
to county attorney or law enforcement for criminal charges, (b) no date provided for 
alleged violence or time lapse between incident and filing, (c) and the petition regarded an 
issue already scheduled for a pending court action. 
 Results show a similar pattern of physical abuse among petitioners regardless of 
whether or not the violence was deemed insufficient to warrant emergency protection. 
Of the ten variables tracked, only one (the claim that the respondent choked or attempted 
to drown the petitioner) was significantly more likely not to be denied for insufficient 
violence. When petitions alleging physical violence were denied for reasons other than 
insufficient violence ( N = 275), they were most frequently denied because they did not fit 
relationship statutes. It should be noted that of the 275 physical abuse cases not resulting 
in a protective order, 17 were withdrawn by the petitioner and not explicitly denied by 
a judge. Improper relationship accounted for 111 of the 256 judicially reviewed denials 
(43.4%), 16.4% were denied and referred to law enforcement for criminal charges, and 
14.5% were denied with no explanation provided. Another 6.6% were denied because 
a time lapse was indicated between the time of abuse and the filing of the petition. 
Combining data from the previous paragraphs, a total of 27 cases (6.8% of the 396 total 
physical abuse cases) were denied because either no date was provided for the alleged 
abuse or the petitioner did not file for emergency protection until some time after the 
alleged abuse. Among these cases, the amount of time ranged from 6 days to 1 year, with 
a mean of 71.6 days and a median of 30 days. 
 Reasons for Denial Among Sexual Abuse Victims 
 The narratives of 22 petitions alleged some form of sexual abuse. These cases represent 
only approximately 1% of denied petitions, but the narratives allege more serious crimes 
than most other denied petitions. Of these 22 petitioners, 59.1% alleged being forcibly 
raped, 22.7% other forced sexual contact, and 18.2% attempted rape. Nine also included 
specific allegations of physical abuse, most often involved pushing, shoving, grabbing, 
slapping, or hitting. 
 The two most frequent reasons for denial in the 22 cases involving alleged sexual abuse 
were “denied but referred to county attorney or law enforcement for criminal charges” 
(27.3%) or denied because of insufficient acts of violence or threat of violence (27.3%). 
Three of the 22 cases involving sexual violence were denied because of an ineligible 
relationship (13.6%). One case was denied for each of the following: petition filed in an 
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improper county, protective order already existed, judge recommended a restraining order 
instead, and the petitioner waited more than 30 days after the alleged incident to file for 
emergency protection. 
 Of the six sexual abuse cases denied because of insufficient acts or threat of violence, four 
alleged forcible rape, three of which also included physical abuse by the  respondent. Of the 
three forcible rape and sexual abuse cases denied solely for insufficient acts or threat of vio-
lence, one was also denied because the petitioner and respondent were involved in a pending 
child custody case, and another was also denied because the petitioner waited 3 weeks to file 
for protection in a different county than the one in which the incident occurred. 
 Reasons for Denial Among Threat Victims 
 There were 944 (42.8%) denied petitions that alleged threat to harm the petitioner or the 
petitioner’s loved ones. Threats included threat to harm or abuse petitioner (56.6%), to kill 
petitioner or have petitioner killed (28.1%), to kidnap or take away children (18.4%), to 
damage or destroy property (11.4%), and to abuse or kill family, friend, or new significant 
other (10.8%). 
 The most common reason for denial among threatened petitioners was due to insuffi-
cient acts or threat of violence (44.7%). Other prominent reasons included (a) not domestic 
relationship (25.6%), (b) referred for criminal charges (12.0%), and (c) no reason provided 
(10.1%). 
 Reasons for Denial Among Stalking Victims 
 Indications of stalking in petitioners’ narratives were determined based on both the peti-
tioner’s claim of being stalked and the occurrence of certain stalking behaviors. Identified 
stalking behaviors included (a) following or spying on petitioner; (b) sending unsolicited 
correspondence; (c) standing or parking outside petitioner’s home, school, or workplace 
for the purpose of surveillance; (d) showing up at places where petitioner was; (e) leaving 
unwanted items for petitioner to find; (f ) trying to communicate with petitioner against 
his/her will; (g) damaging, destroying, or stealing petitioner’s property; (h) making unso-
licited phone calls; and (i) trespassing or breaking into petitioner’s home. Of the 2,205 
denied petitions, 37.4% indicated at least one of these activities; however, most statutory 
definitions of stalking require at least two such activities to be considered stalking, such 
that 14.2% cases fit the legal definition of stalking. Another 32 cases indicated they were 
stalked without explicitly identifying two of the behaviors listed here. Ultimately, 345 
denied petitions (15.6%) indicated stalking explicitly or fit the legal definition by virtue of 
having experienced two or more stalking-related behaviors. 
 More than half the time when a petition with alleged stalking was denied, it was denied 
because of insufficient violence or threat of violence (54.5% of cases). Other frequent 
reasons for denial included (a) not domestic situation/relationship (26.1%), (b) denied and 
referred for criminal charges (18.0%), and (c) no reason provided for denial (7.8%). 
 DISCUSSION 
 Unlike previous studies that have examined the protective order process after the issu-
ance of an order for temporary protection (the middle of the process), the present study 
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 examines cases where a court reviews a petition for emergency protection and denies issu-
ance of a temporary order (the beginning of the process). 
 The first question legitimately posed about denied protective orders is whether, on its 
face, the practice of a judge denying a petition for emergency protection without a hearing 
is a fair practice. In typical civil cases, if a plaintiff petitions a court for emergency injunc-
tive relief and the court denies that request, a date for a hearing is set, and the petitioner is 
afforded the opportunity to offer more detail regarding the harm they are suffering and the 
remedy needed from the court. For states without a requirement for issuance of a summons 
or a hearing if a petition is not granted, a question can be raised as to whether petitioners are 
receiving the same due process as is afforded the respondent in the instance where an order 
is entered and the respondent is given the opportunity to appear for a full hearing. This is 
particularly true when a petition is denied for qualitative reasons (e.g., the judge believes 
the abuse narrated in the petition is insufficient to warrant a protective order) that might be 
elucidated during the verbal exchange and questioning that takes place during a hearing. 
 Analysis of the statewide sample of denied orders in this study finds that approximately 
7.3% of all petitions for civil protection are denied outright, a small overall percentage. 
Findings suggest that individual, contextual, structural, qualitative/perceptual, and proce-
dural factors are associated with the denial of temporary orders. 
 Individual Factors 
 Although the vast majority of extant studies limit their focus to the experience of female 
petitioners, at least one study of  ex-parte orders issued by a court including both genders 
found that 84% of petitioners were women (see Basile, 2005). Among denied orders in this 
study, however, women represented only 66.2% of petitioners; and, in fact, women filing 
against men constituted only half of the orders denied at the initial petition stage. This means 
that nontypical filing statuses (men filing against women and same-sex filing combinations) 
are overrepresented among initially denied protective orders, each representing about 25% 
of denied petitions. Overrepresentation of these categories raises questions regarding ade-
quate protections for male victims of intimate partner violence and for victimized partners 
of same-gendered relationships. Notably, however, same-sex filing combinations most often 
did not represent intimate partners; rather they were filed by nonintimates and were most 
often denied because the relationship did not fit statutory guidelines. 
 Study findings offer some rationale for the gender differences in denied orders. For 
example, men filing against women were most frequently denied because they did not 
indicate sufficient violence or threat of violence (61.4% of cases involving male petitioner 
and female respondent). In fact, among denied cases, 81.8% of petitions filed by men 
against women alleged no physical harm, whereas only 16.5% of women filing against 
women alleged no physical harm. In many instances these cases represent cross-petitions; 
in fact two-thirds of cases denied by judges because they were cross-petitions were filed 
by men against women. Also, petitions filed by men against women were significantly 
more likely to be denied because they were related to a pending child-custody case (χ 2 (1) = 
15.868,  p = .000). 
 Contextual Factors 
 The extant literature indicates that the presence of children plays an influential role as 
women access civil protection from the court. For example, one study found that when 
women perceived a threat to the children if they pursued a protective order, they were 
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deterred from seeking court help (Zoellner et al., 2000). In a study exploring factors 
associated with violations of protective orders, the odds of reabuse for women who had 
biological children with the offender was nearly four times higher than for couples without 
children (Carlson et al., 1999). The current study also reveals troubling findings associated 
with risk to children. Although filing on behalf of minor children is a qualifying status 
according to statute, almost one in five denied petitions was filed on behalf of children. 
One possible indication of why so many petitions filed on behalf of minors were denied 
lies in the relationship between the filing and other pending court actions. Considering 
only the 1,160 cases in which the petitioner was known to have children, 34.4% of cases 
with no custody action pending were filed on behalf of a minor child. Among petitions 
indicating a pending custody hearing, 46.7% were filed on behalf of a minor, a significant 
difference (χ 2 (1) = 5.667,  p = .017). When the same comparison is made for pending 
divorce/dissolution hearings, there are no significant differences (χ 2 (1) = .055,  p = .814). 
Taken together, these data indicate an important association between custody cases and 
emergency protective order petitions filed on behalf of minor children and suggest that 
many are rejected by the court because the parties already have a pending court date for 
essentially the same issue or because they are being viewed as attempts to influence cus-
tody cases. Denial of emergency protection solely because of the presence of other court 
involvement may be a contextual barrier to protection and should be examined to ensure 
that children involved in custody disputes are not unfairly denied protection when, in fact, 
they may be exposed to significant risk. 
 A second contextual factor relates to the type of abuse alleged in denied petitions. 
Among denied petitions in the study, 1% alleged sexual abuse, 18% alleged physical 
abuse, 37.4% alleged stalking, and 42.8% alleged threats. This trend suggests that courts 
are likely to perceive protection as necessary in cases of sexual abuse, but somewhat less 
so in those cases of abuse that may be more difficult to quantify or operationalize for the 
court (e.g., stalking, threat). Abuse types also appear to be treated differently in terms of 
why the petition is denied. Specifically, the most common reason for denial of petitions 
involving physical abuse, stalking, and threat was the court’s judgment that the allega-
tions represented “insufficient acts of abuse or threat of abuse,” whereas for sexual abuse 
allegations, judges referred the petitioner to criminal court. Additional research is needed 
to understand differential treatment of abuse types more fully, particularly as it relates 
to the courts’ understanding of risk associated with stalking victimization and whether 
sexual abuse victims are inadvertently extended less protection by courts who believe the 
case should be handled criminally. Questions also need to be raised regarding whether 
protective order statutes that do not explicitly include “stalking” in the definition of abuse 
introduce a barrier to stalking victims receiving needed protections. In addition to giving 
cause for judicial education, these findings also reinforce the need for access to advocates 
who can assist women in fully articulating their experience of abuse in petitions submitted 
to the judge. Advocates (non-attorney) must be cautious not to practice law, but they can 
play an extraordinarily important role in ensuring that judges understand the full range and 
severity of abuse experienced. 
 Structural Factors 
 The second-most common reason for protective order denial was that the petitioner and 
respondent did not meet the statutorily required relationship of an intimate or family 
member. Of these, only 4.8% of all denied petitions were intimate partners, but this is an 
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important if not large percentage. These cases include current and former dating partners 
who do not currently live together or have a child in common and as a result face the struc-
tural barrier of statutory language. This study suggests that states that do not cover dating 
couples in protective order statutes should consider amending the law to do so in that 
these petitioners experience violence like their married/ex/child in common counterparts, 
but are denied help by not having taken the step of legally formalizing their relationship 
or choosing to have a child. It would also be difficult to argue that extending protection to 
non-cohabiting dating partners be an additional burden to the court when only 105 of more 
than 30,000 protective order cases fall in this category. 
 Qualitative/Perceptual Factors 
 Some standards a petitioner must meet to qualify for a temporary protection are clear-
cut (married or nonmarried), but judges must also make qualitative decisions regarding 
whether the statutory elements are met. For denied orders, the most important of those 
judgments appears to be whether the alleged abuse is sufficient to meet a statutory defini-
tion of abuse or fear of imminent abuse, and in fact a judge’s view that abuse alleged by 
a petitioner did not meet that standard was the primary reason for denial of petitions for 
physical abuse, stalking, and threats. Although variances among deciding judges are to be 
expected, this study suggests reason for concern in that petitions denied for insufficient 
acts of violence or threat of violence did not reflect, on average, significantly fewer acts 
of violence than the petitions of physical abuse victims denied for reasons not including 
insufficient violence. Of the petitions alleging sexual abuse that were denied solely for 
“insufficient abuse,” four involved a forcible rape of the petitioner. Additional research 
is needed to explore the factors involved in judicial decision making, but it is clear that 
judicial education is called for. 
 A second qualitative/perceptual factor that may serve as a barrier to securing civil pro-
tection is the judicial practice of referring petitioners to criminal court in lieu of issuing a 
civil order. Just over 10% of all denied petitions indicated referral to the criminal justice 
system as the sole reason for not issuing the protective order, and, in fact, this was the 
single-most common response to sexual abuse allegations. For other types of abuse, refer-
ral to criminal court was the reason given by the judge for denial in 18% (stalking), 15.3% 
(physical abuse), and 12% (threat) of cases. Additional research should attend to whether 
referral to criminal court represents an attitude among some judges that these cases are 
not appropriately handled civilly (even though no statutory language precludes both legal 
remedies being available to victims). 
 Procedural Factors 
 In 15.5% of cases denied, judges identified “other” reasons for denial, several of which 
outline procedural factors that prevented petitioners from securing protection. Among 
those were that the time lapse indicated between abuse and petition filing was too great or 
that no date was provided (16.2%); and that the petition was incomplete, incorrect, or illeg-
ible (11.5%). These denied petitions may represent valid requests for help but were lost in 
process as a result of procedural barriers. These are also petitioners who may have been in 
a position to secure protection if an advocate or court clerk had been available to ensure 
that the petition was correctly completed. This study would suggest value in exploration 
of procedural obstacles across jurisdictions. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 This study is an analysis of 1 year of protective order data from one state. Generalizability 
is limited by the fact that all state protective order statutes are different, although the fact 
that Kentucky’s law does not appear to be significantly different from the typical conditions 
of most state laws may mitigate that weakness. A second limitation is the study’s reliance 
on secondary data analysis. Nonetheless, findings offer a rare look at the initial stage of the 
emergency protective order process, specifically focusing on petitions for emergency pro-
tection that are denied by the court. They provide important insights into the characteristics 
of petitioners and respondents in these cases and the types of relationships most frequently 
denied. In its analysis of the types of abuse alleged and reasons cited by judges for denial, 
the study lends itself to identification of statutory, practice, and educational changes needed 
to improve the civil justice system. 
 For researchers, advocates, practitioners, policymakers, and legal professionals, under-
standing the details of cases in which the court denies petitions for civil protection can 
provide necessary insights that would improve the court’s ability to extend protection to 
all petitioners who legitimately seek civil intervention. 
 NOTES 
 1 . These percentages total more that 100% because 72 petitioners indicated two manners of 
threat, and 4 indicated all three. 
 2 . The 121 petitioners reporting any physical abuse and who were denied because of insufficient 
acts of threat of violence experienced a mean of 1.48 forms of physical violence (s = .848). The 275 
petitions alleging physical abuse and denied for another reason averaged 1.65 (s = .926) forms of 
physical violence. 
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